119
Cal. App. 4th 1228; 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168; 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1029; 2004 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 5814; 2004 Daily Journal DAR 7940
In
re RAMON STEVENS, on Habeas Corpus.
B170328
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION SIX
119 Cal. App. 4th 1228; 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 168; 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1029; 2004
Cal. Daily Op. Service 5814; 2004 Daily Journal DAR 7940
June 29, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: As modified July 28, 2004.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Modified by In re Stevens, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS
1235 (Cal. App. 2d Dist., July 28, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Superior Court County of Ventura, No.
CR41322, Rebecca S. Riley, Judge.
COUNSEL: Ramon Stevens, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Frances T. Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland and Nicholas N. Paul, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Gilbert, P. J., with Coffee and Perren, JJ., concurring.
OPINIONBY: GILBERT
OPINION: GILBERT, P. J.--A convicted child molester serving a
prison sentence is released on parole. A parole condition prohibits his use of
computers and the Internet, although his crime did not involve a computer. We
conclude this prohibition is unreasonable.
BACKGROUND
In 1997, Ramon Stevens pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct inflicted
upon a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) n1 Stevens had
befriended the victim in a youth program. After his arrest, police seized an
album of photographs of naked boys and a video recording of Stevens having sex
with an adult male. A search of Stevens's home computer revealed it was not
used to download child pornography, to contact the victim, or to commit a
crime.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
On July 12, 2002, the authorities released Stevens from prison and placed
him on parole. A special term of his parole stated: "You shall not possess
or have access to computer hardware or software including the internet."
Stevens complains that this condition is unreasonable and frustrates his
ability to earn a living.
Stevens petitioned the superior court for habeas corpus. He asserted that
the condition of parole restricting his Internet use 1) bore no connection to
the crime of which he was convicted; 2) related to conduct which is not
criminal; and 3) forbade conduct not reasonably related to future criminal
acts. (See People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 627 [64 Cal.
Rptr. 290].) Stevens complained that the restriction on his use of a computer
infringes on his right to engage in "compensable employment" as an
author and Internet entrepreneur. (See People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.
App. 3d 1277, 1281 [253 Cal. Rptr. 130].) He argued that the public is
protected because a parole condition prohibits him from contacting anyone under
the age of 18 years and the authorities may monitor his computer activity
through his Internet service provider (ISP), which keeps records of every site
its subscribers visit.
The superior court denied the petition. It found that although there was no
evidence that Stevens used a computer to commit crime, the parole condition was
reasonably related to deter future criminality.
Stevens sought relief from this court. We issued an order to show cause.
Thereafter, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) modified Stevens's special parole
condition to allow him limited use of the Internet. He may not use the computer
to access pornographic Web sites or communicate with minors.
BPT moved this court to dismiss the petition as moot. It asserts its
practices do not flout judicial or parole authorities. (See Giles v. Horn
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 228-229 [123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 735].) BPT argues that
conditions of parole are case specific and, as such, do not lend themselves to
be reviewed in moot cases. Stevens's parole agent attests that there is no
blanket policy that prohibits parolees from using the Internet.
DISCUSSION
1. Mootness
Review of a moot issue is appropriate where it is "of great public
import and transcend[s] the concerns of these particular parties." (Beilenson
v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal. App.4th 944, 949 [52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357].)
Even when moot, a novel question of continuing public interest is often
deserving of consideration by an appellate court. (Morehart v. County of
Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 746-747 [29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804, 872 P.2d
143] [determining the validity of local zoning ordinance was important to
orderly planning even though moot]; John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified
School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301, 307 [187 Cal. Rptr. 472, 654 P.2d 242]
[student's readmission to school did not render moot due process issues
concerning expulsion].)
(1) That parole restrictions may be case specific does not
necessarily affect mootness. This case, however novel, reflects the challenge
courts face as they seek to apply traditional principles of law to issues
involving cyberspace. There are federal cases speaking to this issue, but as
yet no published California opinion dealing with the issue. n2 Each year, more
than 115,000 parolees are released from our state prisons and are returned into
a society increasingly linked to the Internet. (Cal. Dept. of Corrections,
County and Region of Parole Data Analysis Unit, Estimates and Analysis Section
(May 2003) Ref. No. Misc-5, table 1A, p. 4.) Parole officers must determine
what criteria they should use in deciding which parolees will be denied access
to the Internet. We trust our decision will provide guidance to parole officers
who bear the responsibility of designing effective and reasonable conditions of
parole. We therefore deny the motion to dismiss.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 In People v. Baird (2003) 116 Cal.App.4th 1318 [11 Cal. Rptr. 3d
392], Division Five of this District recently dealt with the violation of
probation by a person who had been convicted of using a computer in an attempt
to seduce a minor (§§ 664, 288.2, subd. (b)) and distribution of child
pornography (§ 311.2, subd. (d)). As a term of probation, Baird was ordered
" 'not [to] associate with and stay away from the internet and all
computers.' " (People v. Baird, supra, at p. 1320.) The
issue on appeal did not concern the validity of this condition, but whether the
violation of section 311.2, subdivision (d) could be punished as a felony.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Conditions of Parole: An Overview
Our Legislature has found that "the period immediately following
incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into
society and to positive citizenship. It is in the interest of public safety for
the state to provide for the supervision of and surveillance of parolees,
including the judicious use of revocation actions, and to provide educational,
vocational, family and personal counseling necessary to assist parolees in the
transition between imprisonment and discharge." (§ 3000, subd. (a)(1).)
The fundamental goal of parole "is to help individuals reintegrate into
society as constructive individuals" (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972)
408 U.S. 471, 477 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593]), " 'to end criminal
careers through the rehabilitation of those convicted of crime' " (People
v. Reed (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 135, 140 [28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509]) and to
become self-supporting.
(2) Parolees have fewer constitutional rights than do ordinary
persons. (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 482.)
"Although a parolee is no longer confined in prison[,] his custody status
is one which requires and permits supervision and surveillance under
restrictions which may not be imposed on members of the public generally."
(People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 531 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714
P.2d 1251], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Reyes (1998) 19
Cal.4th 743, 754, 756 [80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 968 P.2d 445]; see also U. S.
v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 119 [151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 122 S. Ct. 587].)
The state may impose any condition reasonably related to parole supervision. (§
3053, subd. (a).) The criteria for assessing the constitutionality of
conditions of probation also applies to conditions of parole. (In re Naito
(1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 1656, 1661 [231 Cal. Rptr. 506], citing People v.
Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 532.) The expectation of privacy is
the same whether the search condition is a condition of probation or parole. (People
v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 330 [2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 73 P.3d 496].)
Conditions of parole typically bar a parolee from having contact with old
associates or engaging in past activities; they are designed to prevent the
parolee from reverting to a former crime-inducing lifestyle. (People v.
Denne (1956) 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 508 [297 P.2d 451]; 3 Witkin &
Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 629, p. 827.)
(3) There are, however, limits upon the parole authority's
imposition of restrictions. Parole conditions, like conditions of probation,
must be reasonable since parolees retain "constitutional protection
against arbitrary [and] oppressive official action." (People v.
Thompson (1967) 252 Cal. App. 2d 76, 84 [60 Cal. Rptr. 203].) Conditions of
parole must be reasonably related to the compelling state interest of fostering
a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal. App.
3d 141, 146 [158 Cal. Rptr. 562].) Thus, a condition that bars lawful activity
will be upheld only if the prohibited conduct either 1) has a relationship to
the crime of which the offender was convicted, or 2) is reasonably related to
deter future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [124
Cal. Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545].)
3. Cyberspace
The 20th century witnessed the stunning growth of mass communication
through the media of radio, television, movies, and telephone. (Bimber,
Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political
Power (2003) pp. 75-88; Smith, Redeeming the Time (1987) pp. 920-921.) The past
decade has borne witness to even more ways in which information is exchanged.
"America is reacting, generally, to the omnipresence of cyberspace, [fn.
omitted] made possible by the rise of new forms of electronic communication.
Specifically, the Internet, now past its nascence, comprises the 'backbone' of
American academic, governmental, and economic information systems. [Fn.
omitted.]" (Schweiger, The Path of E-Law: Liberty, Property, and
Democracy from the Colonies to the Republic of Cyberia (1998) 24 Rutgers
Computer & Tech. L.J. 223, pp. 224-225.) "Computers and Internet
access have become virtually indispensable in the modern world of
communications and information gathering." (U. S. v. Peterson (2d
Cir. 2001) 248 F.3d 79, 83-84.)
In Hall v. LaRonde (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1342 [66 Cal. Rptr. 2d
399], we took note of the important role electronic communications play in
business transactions. Electronic communication may establish the necessary
minimum contacts in a state to establish jurisdiction over a defendant.
The Supreme Court has characterized the Internet as "a vast library
including millions of readily available and indexed publications ... ." (Reno
v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 853 [138 L. Ed. 2d
874, 117 S. Ct. 2329].) In recent years, the legal profession has been fast
drawn to cyberspace. Westlaw and Lexis are basic research tools. Our state
superior courts post their dockets and other relevant information on the web.
Opinions of the California Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal are available on
the Internet within moments of filing. For better or worse, the computer and
the Internet have facilitated the writing of this opinion.
A study in 2003, conducted by the Pew Research Center, estimated that there
were 200 million users of the Internet in the United States. (Madden, America's
Online Pursuits (Dec. 12, 2003) Pew Research Center, Internet & Am.
Life Project <http://www.pewinternet.org.> [as of June 11, 2004].) The
study noted that 63 percent of this nation's adults were using the Internet. (Ibid.)
As of January of 2004 there are approximately 233.1 million users of the
Internet. (Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004) __ U.S. __
[159 L.Ed.2d 690, 705, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2794].)
"Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide
variety of communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently
constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic mail (e-mail),
automatic mailing list services ('mail exploders,' sometimes referred to as
'listservs'), 'newsgroups,' 'chat rooms,' and the 'World Wide Web.' All of
these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures,
and moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique
medium--known to its users as 'cyberspace'--located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with
access to the Internet. [P] E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic
message--generally akin to a note or letter--to another individual or to a
group of addressees." (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra,
521 U.S. at p. 851.) "[P]ublic debate is enabled by removing perhaps the
most significant cost of human interaction--synchronicity. I can add to your
conversation tonight; you can follow it up tomorrow; someone else, the day
after." (Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) p. 10 (Lessig).)
(4) "With the Internet, the average computer blogger has, in
effect, his or her own printing press to reach the world." (Vo v. City
of Garden Grove (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 425, 453 [9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257]
(conc. & dis. opn. of Sills, J.) n3 Restrictions upon access to the
Internet necessarily curtail First Amendment rights. (Ashcroft v. American
Civil Liberties Union, supra, __ U.S. __ [124 S.Ct. 2783]; Clement
v. California Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir. 2004) 364 F.3d 1148.)
"The architecture of the Internet, as it is right now, is perhaps the most
important model of free speech since the founding [of the Republic]. Two
hundred years after the framers ratified the Constitution, the Net has taught
us what the First Amendment means. ... The model for speech that the framers
embraced was the model of the Internet--distributed, noncentralized, fully free
and diverse." (Lessig, supra, at pp. 167, 185.) "Through the
use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a
voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer." (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra,
521 U.S. at p. 870.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Blog: "A Web site (or section of a Web site) where users can
post a chronological, up-to-date e-journal entry of their thoughts. Each post
usually contains a Web link. Basically, it is an open forum communication tool
that, depending on the Web site, is either very individualistic or performs a
crucial function for a company." (Jensen, Netlingo the Internet Dictionary
(1995-2004) <WWW.Netlingo.com/inframes.cfm> (as of June 11, 2004) see
also Davis, Rants, Rulings, & Recipes (June 2004) Cal. Lawyer, pp.
22-25.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. Child Molesters and the Internet
(5) Society has a strong interest in protecting its youth from the
harmful effects of obscene material. (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 869-870; Ginsberg v. State of New York (1968)
390 U.S. 629 [20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 88 S. Ct. 1274].) Some child molesters reach
their victims through the Internet. (U. S. v. Zinn (11th Cir. 2003) 321
F.3d 1084, 1093 [the court found that limited restriction on child pornography
offender's Internet usage was reasonably related to legitimate sentencing
considerations]; U. S. v. Paul (5th Cir. 2001) 274 F.3d 155.)
"[Defendant] Paul ... used the Internet to encourage exploitation of
children by seeking out fellow 'boy lovers' and providing them with advice on
how to find and obtain access to 'young friends.' Restricting his access to
this communication medium clearly serves the dual statutory goals of protecting
the public and preventing future criminal activity." (U. S. v. Paul,
supra, at p. 169.)
In United States v. Rearden (9th Cir. 2003) 349 F.3d 608, defendant
was convicted of shipping child pornography over the Internet. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the imposition of a probation condition prohibiting the
defendant from possessing or using a computer with access to any online service
without prior approval of the probation officer, noting that the restriction
was "reasonably related to the offense that involved e-mail transmissions
of quite graphic child pornography, and to the important goal of deterring him
during the period of supervision from reverting to similar conduct, and thus,
to rehabilitation and protecting the public." (Id. at p. 621.)
In United States v. Crandon (3d Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 122, defendant
solicited a minor by e-mail and traveled to the victim's hometown where he
engaged in sexual relations with her. He pled guilty to receiving child
pornography and was sentenced to 78 months imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. (Id. at p. 125.) The terms of parole included a
special condition directing that defendant "not 'possess, procure,
purchase or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin
board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers unless specifically
approved by the United States Probation Office.' " (Ibid.)
On appeal, it was asserted that the special condition unnecessarily
infringed upon defendant's liberty interests and bore no logical relation to
his offense. The Third Circuit held that because the defendant "used the
Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl
over a period of several months[,] ... the condition of release limiting [the
defendant's] Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring him from
recidivism and protecting the public." (U. S. v. Crandon, supra,
173 F.3d at pp. 127-128.) The court held that even though this special
restriction "may hamper [defendant's] employment opportunities upon
release" (id. at p. 128), and infringe upon his First Amendment
rights, "the restrictions ... are permissible because the special
condition is narrowly tailored and is directly related to deterring [the
defendant] and protecting the public. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
(6) But "[i]t is not enough to show that the Government's ends
are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those
ends." (Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C. (1989)
492 U.S. 115, 126 [106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 109 S. Ct. 2829].) A state may restrict a
constitutional right, but only when narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest. (Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court (2002) 94
Cal.App.4th 1417, 1427 [115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439].) The state's power to inhibit
free speech is limited. " '[T]he government may enforce reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions "are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." [Citations.]'
" (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1125
[226 Cal. Rptr. 164].) "Because laws that attempt to regulate expression
'pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,' [citation], they are
carefully scrutinized. [Citation.]" (Berry v. City of Santa Barbara (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1083 [47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661]; see also Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union, supra, __ U.S. __ [124 S.Ct. at p.
2791].)
The federal Second Circuit has staked out a policy of wide-open access to
the Internet regardless of whether a computer was used for the underlying
crime. In Peterson, defendant was convicted of larceny. He had prior
state convictions for incest and accessing adult pornography on his home
computer. A condition of probation banned his use of the Internet. (U. S. v.
Peterson, supra, 248 F.3d at pp. 82-84.) Noting that computers and
Internet access are essential to communication and the gathering of
information, the Second Circuit ruled the ban unreasonable. (Id. at p.
83.)
The defendant in United States v. Sofsky (2d Cir 2002) 287 F.3d 122,
was convicted of possession of child pornography and, as a condition of
probation, he was not allowed access to the Internet. The Second Circuit struck
the restriction. The appellate court acknowledged that "access to a
computer and the Internet after serving his ... sentence can facilitate
continuation of his electronic receipt of child pornography, but we are more
persuaded by the observation in Peterson that '[a]lthough a defendant
might use the telephone to commit fraud, this would not justify a condition of
probation that includes an absolute bar on the use of telephones.' [Citation.]
The same could be said of a prohibition on the use of the mails imposed on a
defendant convicted of mail fraud. ... Although the condition prohibiting
Sofsky from accessing a computer or the Internet without his probation
officer's approval is reasonably related to the purposes of his sentencing, in light
of the nature of his offense, we hold that the condition inflicts a greater
deprivation on Sofsky's liberty than is reasonably necessary." (Id.
at p. 126.)
United States v. White (2001) 244 F.3d 1199, reaches a middle
ground. Responding to an Internet advertisement posted as part of a sting
operation, the defendant in White ordered videotapes advertised as
containing child pornography. The defendant pled guilty to possessing child
pornography and served a two-year sentence. After completing his sentence,
defendant twice violated a requirement of his supervised release by consuming
alcohol. The district court found him to be in violation of parole and
sentenced the defendant to six months' incarceration. As a special condition,
the court banned defendant from possessing a computer with access to the
Internet. Defendant challenged this special condition, arguing that a
"plea to a single count of receiving child pornography which he ordered
over the Internet ... is not 'reasonably related' to prohibiting him from all
access to the Internet" (id. at p. 1205) and that this
"special condition [was] 'greater than necessary' in the equation
balancing protection of the public with the goals of sentencing." (Ibid.)
The 10th Circuit held that the absolute restriction upon Internet access to
be too narrow as well as overbroad. It found the condition potentially too
narrow because the terms of the condition were unspecified. For example, the
condition did not bar the defendant from accessing the Internet at a library or
cyber cafe, but simply enjoined him from owning a computer with such access.
The court found the condition potentially too broad because the district court
may have intended the word "possess" to restrict usage unrelated to
the defendant's underlying crime. From that viewpoint, the sentence was "
'greater than necessary.' " (U. S. v. White, supra, 244 F.3d
at p. 1205.) The court thus found the restriction "neither reasoned nor
reasonable" and remanded the case for clarification on the condition of
prohibiting the defendant from owning a computer with Internet access. (Id. at
p. 1207.)
(7) In United States v. Freeman (3d Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 386,
392, the Third Circuit reconsidered its holding in Crandon and
essentially adopted the 10th Circuit's approach. "There is no need to cut
off ... access to email or benign [I]nternet usage when a more focused
restriction ... can be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored
on [the defendant's] hard drive or removable disks." (Ibid.)
5. The Instant Case
(8) Here, BPT was legitimately concerned that a released child
molester's unfettered access to a computer might result in criminal conduct.
In contrast to cases such as Crandon, Paul and Rearden,
the broad prohibition on use of the computer and Internet bore no relation to
Stevens's conviction for child molestation and imposed a greater restriction of
his rights than was reasonably necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate
goal.
BPT, concerned about Stevens's illegitimate use of the Internet, sought to
prevent his having any access to cyberspace. One can understand the dilemma BPT
faced. "[C]yberspace defies boundaries; it offers unlimited access. '[T]he
openness of this architecture means this: That there is no "natural"
or simple or "automatic" way to keep people out because there are no
natural or real borders that close off access to those who should not have
access.' [Citation.]" (U. S. v. White, supra, 244 F.3d at p.
1207.)
But BPT's task was less daunting than it appeared to be. A focused
restriction could be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on
Stevens's hard drive or his removable disks. (U. S. v. Freeman, supra,
316 F.3d at p. 392.; U. S. v. Sofsky, supra, 287 F.3d at pp.
126-127.) BPT might also have explored the implementation of monitoring
software which automatically generates an e-mail to the parole officer should
the parolee engage in an illegal use of his computer. (See, e.g., McKay, Guardrails
on the Information Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the
Adjudicated Sex Offender (2003) 106 W.Va. L.Rev. 203, 242.) Finally, BPT
can verify Stevens's Internet usage with a sting operation--surreptitiously
inviting him to respond to government-placed Internet ads for pornography. (See
U. S. v. White, supra, 244 F.3d at p. 1201.)
BPT cannot, of course, monitor every aspect of Stevens's behavior. Other
than a prohibition on his use of a computer to access pornographic sites, BPT
would most likely be unable to monitor Stevens's use of someone else's
computer. But like any other parolee, Stevens's unauthorized use of any
computer would be at his own peril.
Conclusion
As observed by Sir William S. Gilbert, a felon's "capacity for
innocent enjoyment is just as great as any honest man's." (Gilbert &
Sullivan, Pirates of Penzance (1880) act II.) Rehabilitation of a felon entails
integration into society where he or she can be self-supporting. In appropriate
cases, access to the Internet assists parolees to become law-abiding citizens.
The order to show cause, having served its purpose, is discharged. Because
the parole authority modified its restrictions on Steven's computer and
Internet access, we now deny the petition as moot.
Coffee, J., and Perren, J., concurred.
On July 28, 2004, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.